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Resumen 
El propósito de este trabajo es presentar un enfoque metodológico integrador que sirva de 
apoyo a la toma de decisiones. 
Hasta ahora la literatura científica ha producido principalmente trabajos de dos clases: 
análisis descriptivo, que se refiere a los procesos reales que caracterizan la valoración y 
selección de los individuos, y el análisis normativo, que analiza los procesos de selección 
realizados por individuos racionales idealizados.  
Entonces, cuando hablamos de un enfoque integrador, pretendemos desarrollar una 
metodología, que aun partiendo de instrumentos cuantitativos típicos del análisis 
normativo, tome también en consideración las implicancias cognitivo-comportamentales 
obtenidas por los especialistas en toma de decisión. Hemos desarrollado un modelo 
aplicativo basado en el análisis jerárquico fuzzy (FHA), en el que a las capacidades del 
proceso de jerarquía analítico (AHP) de racionalizar el proceso de decisión sin prescindir 
de las valoraciones, se añaden elementos de la teoría de conjuntos borrosos que permiten 
al decisor expresar la ambigüedad de su propia valoración. 
Este método corrige los juicios tomando en consideración los llamados sesgos cognitivos, 
es decir, distorsiones subjetivas relacionadas con la percepción de la utilidad y la 
incertidumbre.  
Por último, se ha llevado a cabo una experiencia para verificar el valor del modelo 
propuesto, los límites de su aplicabilidad y los posibles desarrollos futuros. 
Palabras clave: análisis jerárquico fuzzy, toma de decisión, enfoque cognitivo. 
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Abstract 
This paper aims to propose a methodological integrated approach to support experts in 
decision making situation. 
Until now scientific literature has mainly produced works of two types: descriptive 
analysis, that talks about the real processes that characterize the evaluation and 
selection of individuals, and the normative analysis, that analyses the process of 
selection made by rational individuals. 
When we talk about an integrated approach, we try to develop a methodology, that even 
starting off of typical quantitative instruments of the normative analysis, also takes in 
consideration the cognitive side obtained by the specialists in decision making.  We have 
developed an empirical model based on the fuzzy hierarchical analysis (FHA). In addition 
the capacities of Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to rationalize the process of decision 
considering the evaluations, elements of the fuzzy set theory are considered in order to 
allow experts to express the ambiguity of their own evaluations. 
The proposed methodology corrects the judgments taking in consideration the so called 
cognitive biases, that is to say, subjective distortions related to the perception of utility 
and uncertainty. Finally, an experience has been carried out to verify the value of the 
proposed model, the limits of its applicability and possible future developments. 
Keywords: Fuzzy hierarchical analysis, Decision making, Cognitive approach.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we show the first empirical results obtained using some 
models that cognitive psychology built up into the so-called “descriptive 
analysis”, with regard to the multi-criteria decision making support 
technique known as “fuzzy hierarchical analysis” (FHA). In particular 
we adopt “prospect theory” and “ambiguity model” to correct biases in 
experts’ judgements corresponding to the pairwise comparisons in the 
FHA.  
We show that using the proposed method we are able to improve the 
accuracy of the priority vectors assessed by the solutions of the FHA 
technique.  
 
2. COGNITIVE BIASES INFLUENCE IN DECISION MAKING: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In literature we find three kind of approaches to decision making, all of 
them having different subjects’ backgrounds. 
The first one is called normative analysis (Savage 1954; Luce and Raiffa 
1957; Fishburn and Kochenberger, 1979; Fishburn, 1982), and takes 
its origins from the game theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944), that lays the grounds of Utility Theory (UT). Through the 
assessment of order, independence and continuity axioms, UT implies 
the existence of a real valued function u(x) defined on the subset X of 
possible outcomes (or states of the world) that gives a numerical 
structure to the choice options (see Fig.1). In particular let  … p,q, , be 
probability distributions defined on a set X of outcomes. Each  P p∈  
can be viewed as a risky alternative that yields outcome  X x∈  with 
probability  () x p , with the ( ) x p  summing to unity. The overall utility of 
an alternative p is therefore  
 Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
∈
=
X x
x u x p p u . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Von Neumann – Morgerstern utility function (1944) 
 
In general normative analysis has to do with how idealized, rational 
people should think and should act. Such analyses abstract away 
known cognitive concerns of real people, their internal disorders, their 
shifting values, their anxieties and post-decisional regrets, their 
rejection for ambiguity, their inabilities to do intricate calculations, and 
their limited attention span. The hallmarks of such normative analyses 
are coherence and rationality, usually captured in axioms of the form: 
if the decision maker believes so and so, he should do such and such. 
Axioms and basic principles are motivated by what some investigator 
thinks is logical, rational, intelligent behaviour, and yield conditions of 
optimality for choice. 
The second approach is known as descriptive analysis (Allais 1953; 
Simon 1955, 1956; McNeil et al. 1962; Slovic and Tversky 1974; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Einhorn and Hogarth 1978), a highly 
empirical activity that lies in the social sciences concerned with 
individual behaviour, which poses questions like: how do real people 
think and behave? How do they perceive uncertainties, accumulate 
evidence, learn and update perceptions? What are their hang-ups, 
biases, internal conflicts? Which are the processes that bring them to 
make a choice? How can their behaviour be (approximately) described? Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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In other words, descriptive analysts are concerned with how and why 
people think and act the way they do. They try answering that 
questions without any interest in trying to modify, influence or moralize 
individual behaviour (see Fig.2). 
value 
gain loss 
 
Figure 2. Value function in the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
 
Two among the most noteworthy descriptive models of human 
behaviour are the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and 
the ambiguity model (Einhorn and Hogarth; see ref. in Hogarth 1986). 
The first one shows through empirical evidence how perception of value 
(=utility) in assessing preferences and decisions commonly deviates 
from the original linear shape assumed by von Neumann-Morgerstern 
utility function. The second highlights that people are ambiguous 
concerning the probabilities of events that can affect outcomes. In 
Einhorn-Hogarth model people are assumed to assess ambiguous 
probabilities by first anchoring on some value of the probability and 
then adjusting this figure by mentally simulating or imagining other 
values the probability could take. This process basically depends on 
the decision maker’s attitude toward uncertainty, which reflects his 
personal tendencies such as optimism or pessimism. Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
 
42
anchor
1 0
1
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
 
 
p
1 0
1
1 0
1
0.5
anchor
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
 
 
p
anchor
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
 
 
p
(a) (b)
(c)
anchor
1 0
1
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
 
 
p
1 0
1
1 0
1
0.5
anchor
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
 
 
p
anchor
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
 
 
p
(a) (b)
(c)
 
Figure 3. Ambiguity model (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986) 
 
In panel (a), for example, values of the probability below the diagonal 
(that represents the anchor value) are weighted in imagination more 
heavily than those above; in case of determining the chances of 
obtaining a positive outcome this reflects a pessimistic attitude. In 
panel (c) values above the diagonal are weighted more heavily than 
those below; in case of determining the chances of obtaining a positive 
outcome this reflects an optimistic attitude. Panel (b) reflects what we 
may call neutral attitude. 
In the third and last approach to decision making, researchers (often 
called “methodologist”) are concerned with the bottom line: how to 
improve the quality of decisions in practice? It is one thing to talk of 
axioms and proofs (normative side) and of cognitive limitations and 
biases (descriptive side), but how can we really help people making 
better decisions? They therefore try to devise methods that incorporate 
the insights gained from normative theories, but in a way that Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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recognizes the cognitive limitations of the decision maker. To this 
approach belong several methods supporting decision making among 
which there is the Fuzzy Hierarchical Analysis (FHA). On FHA we 
implement our model as described in section 4. 
We believe this paper also pertains to the last kind of approach to 
decision making, even though we use in the FHA some cognitive 
models, that makes our perspective new and maybe wider. But we still 
adapt that descriptive theories in a method.  
Our aim is still posed in the question: how can we help people to make 
better decisions? 
 
3. THE FHA AS MULTI-ATTRIBUTE DECISION MAKING SUPPORT TECHNIQUE 
The FHA develops Saaty’s original hierarchical analysis (Saaty 1977, 
1978, 1980), when the experts (judges,...) are allowed to use fuzzy 
ratios in place of exact ratios. In Saaty’s hierarchical analysis a person 
(expert, judge,...) is asked to supply ratios  ij a  for each pairwise 
comparison between issues (alternatives, candidates,...)  n A , , A , A … 2 1  for 
each criterion in a hierarchy, and also between the criteria. For some 
specific criterion, if a person considers  1 A  more important than  5 A , 
then  15 a  might equal  1 3 , or  1 5 , or  1 7 . The numbers of the ratios are 
usually taken from the set { } 9 2 1 , , , …  so  15 a  could be  5 1 s s  for 
{} 9 2 1 5 1 , , , s , s … ∈  and  5 1 s s > . The ratios  ij a  indicate, for this expert, the 
strenght with which  i A  dominates  j A . If  15 a  is equal to  1 5 , then  51 a  is 
taken as  5 1 . That is,  1 − = ij ji a a  and  1 = ii a  for all i. Let A be the  n n ×  
matrix whose entries are the ratios  ij a . A is called a positive reciprocal 
matrix. Saaty’s procedure uses the pairwise comparison matrices A for 
each criterion, and also the pairwise comparison matrix for the criteria, Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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to compute a final set of weights  i w  ( ) 1   0 2 1 = + + + > n i w w w , w …  for the 
alternatives which can be used to rank the issues from highest to 
lowest. 
We easily can recognize that is difficult for people to always assign 
exact ratios when comparing two alternatives. When comparing  1 A  and 
5 A  a person might feel that  1 A  is much more important than  5 A . Does 
this mean that  15 a  equals  1 5 ,  1 7  or  1 9 ? Using fuzzy numbers (Zadeh 
1965; Zimmermann 1993; Dubois and Prade 1980) an expert can 
respond that  15 a  is between 7 and 9. Also, a person could feel that  1 A  
is little more important than  5 A . An appropriate fuzzy ratio in this case 
might be approximately 3. Fuzzy numbers automatically incorporate 
the vagueness of these replies. 
There are several methods to compute the fuzzy final weights 
representing the priority vector. They consist in an extension of Saaty’s 
procedure to fuzzy reciprocal matrices, and was first introduced by van 
Laarhoven and Pedricz (1983). Other researchers developed more 
accurate methods (Buckley 1985, Buckley et al, 2001; Boender et al 
1989, Gogus and Boucher, 1997). Anyway, choosing one method rather 
than another does not change or invalidate the model we introduce in 
section 4 to improve the accuracy of the FHA technique. 
 
4. METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSAL 
We made clear the FHA is an expert based technique, that an 
individual is asked to supply judgements for each pairwise comparison, 
in particular we will represent these judgements through triangular Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
 
45
fuzzy numbers
∗. If we now imagine the support to decision making (in 
this case the FHA) being an opened system as shown in Fig. 4, we 
recognize expert’s judgements correspond to the input of such a 
system. Similarly we may define its output as the solution of the 
decision making problem yielded by the technique. 
 
  Decision Making 
Support Technique
INPUT 
expert’s 
judgements 
OUTPUT 
solution: 
priority vector 
 
Figure 4. Decision making support technique in expert’s judgements 
 
In this scenario it is easy to realize that if expert’s judgements are 
affected by some cognitive biases, and we know they really are 
(according to descriptive models), there are no reasons for us to think 
the output will not keep these distortions no matter how good the 
support technique is. Hence our focus will be on the “input” of the 
above-mentioned system, proposing a model that tries to correct 
expert’s judgements and their biases. 
For our purposes we first define triangular fuzzy numbers representing 
expert’s judgements as functions of two variables: the modal value  m v  
and the uncertainty i that contains all the elements that univocally 
determine the fuzzy number spread. We then perform two independent 
transformations (see Fig. 5) for the fuzzy number  ( ) i , v a ~
m    thereby 
defined; one operating on  m v  through the value function of prospect 
theory and another operating on i through the ambiguity function of 
ambiguity model. 
 
                                                 
∗ The method can easily be extended to an FHA that uses other types of fuzzy numbers. 
Using triangular shaped fuzzy numbers does not therefore mean a lost in generality for 
the concepts of our proposal. Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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( ) i , v a ~
m   ( ) * *
m
* i , v a ~  
i
m v *
m v
* i
value function 
(prospect theory) 
ambiguity function 
(ambiguity model)
 
Figure 5. Transformation methodology proposed for the fuzzy number 
 
When a person gives an evaluation of a pairwise comparison that we 
set as  m v , he is actually supplying a perceived value, which fits the 
shape of prospect theory value function. If we want to obtain something 
closer to an “objective value” we shall find the point  ( ) y , x P  of the value 
function such that  m v y =  (see Fig.6), and then perform the 
substitution: 
x v y v *
m m = → =                   . 
For example, if the expert’s assessment is  6 = m v , we will find his 
unbiased evaluation  7 7. v*
m =  in the following way. Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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*
m v
m v
 
3 0
( ) y , x P
 
 
Figure 6. Objectification of the proposed value 
 
 
 
1
1/2 
 
 
Figure 7. Measure of the fuzziness representing the expert’s judgements 
 
For the second transformation we shall first assign to the decision 
maker (or to the group of decision makers) his proper curve among 
those shown in Fig.3. We can further work out a measure of fuzziness 
of the fuzzy number representing the expert’s judgement (see Fig.7). 
This can be made through the “index of fuzziness” by Kaufmann (1975) 
defined on a fuzzy set  A ~
 as follows: Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
 
48
() () () ∑ − =
i
i A ~ i A ~ x x A ~ d
2 1 µ µ , 
where  2 1 A ~
 is the 1/2-cut of  A ~
, remembering from fuzzy set theory that 
 
() ( )


 ≥
=
otherwise 0
2 1     if 1 ~
~
2 1
x
x
A
A
µ
µ . 
 
Since we deal with particular kinds of fuzzy set having continuous 
membership function (fuzzy numbers), it is legitimate to use a slightly 
different index of fuzziness:  
() () ()x x x A ~ D
X
A ~ A ~ d
2 1 ∫ − = µ µ , 
which represents for the fuzzy number  ( ) 7 6 3 , , a ~ =  taken as example, 
the marked area in Fig. 7. 
If we set  ( ) A ~ D D
A ~ max max =  as the index of fuzziness of the most 
ambiguous fuzzy set, this quantity only depends on the evaluation 
scale chosen. As a matter of fact the ambiguity of a fuzzy set is higher if 
its membership function gets closer to the value  2 1 , in which case it is 
obviously more difficult to determine if the element x belongs or not to 
the set. If, for example, we use Saaty’s scale (from the 
set{} 9 2   1   2 1 9 1 , , , , , , … … ), we will have 
5 4
2
9
. Dmax = ≅ , 
while the set with highest ambiguity will be defined by a membership 
function  ( ) 2 1 = x µ  for all  9 0 ≤ < x . At this point we can name the 
ratio  () max D a ~ D  as relative fuzziness, and further consider its 
complement to unity: Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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() ( )
max D
a ~ D
a ~ c − = 1 , 
defining it as a confidence rate evaluation. We can interpret this rate as 
a reliance degree that the decision maker assesses for its own 
judgement. Hence when a person establishes the shape of the fuzzy 
number fixing its spread, he is actually assessing the amount of 
uncertainty of his statement, and consequently a probability estimate 
of his judgement accuracy. 
If we want to remove the biases connected with the decision maker’s 
attitudes toward ambiguity, and obtain a more objective value we shall 
enter with the value of  ( ) a ~ c  the individual’s ambiguity function from 
the y-axis (that represents perceived probability) and take out the 
correspondent value on the x-axis (that represent the objective 
probability i.e. the anchor). For our example we used the fuzzy number 
() 7 6 3 , , a ~ =  whose confidence rate is  ( ) 78 0. a ~ c = . Assuming expert’s 
ambiguity curve is the one shown in Figure 8, we shall perform the 
substitution: 
() ( ) 0.88                   0.78 = → =
* a ~ c a ~ c . 
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               Figure 8. Expert’s ambiguity curve Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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The new value for the confidence rate means we have to change the 
shape of the fuzzy number, modifying its spread in a way that its 
fuzziness would yield a confidence rate of 0.88. It is important to 
highlight that any transformation we perform on the spread will be 
coherent with the original shape of the fuzzy number, that is they will 
keep the proportion between the distance from upper to modal value 
and the distance from lower to modal value. 
In our particular case, the spread of the fuzzy number will have to be 
smaller to increase the confidence rate from 0.78 to 0.88. The resulting 
fuzzy number after the spread transformation presented in Fig.9. 
 
    
1    
Before 
After  
1    2     3      4    5      6     7     8    9
 
Figure 9. Fuzzy number after spread transformation 
 
For further information about the connection between optimism 
pessimism and assessing probabilities see also Gibson and 
Sanbonmatsu (2004). 
 
5. TEST OF THE MODEL: THE EXPERIMENT 
The validation of the consistency and reliability of the model has been 
tested in an experiment compounded by two slightly different 
perception based tests. In the first one the test subjects have been 
asked to compare pairs of different size circles (Fig 10a), while in the Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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second one comparisons were concerned with figures having different 
grey-degree colour (Fig 10b).  
 
a 
b 
 
Figure 10. Box of the figure used in the perception test 
 
In both perception based test, the sample was asked to evaluate, 
following their perception, the difference between a pair of figures. (e.g: 
showing a box with only circles one and five, we asked individuals: how 
many times circle one is bigger than circle number 5). Every person 
had to answer using the evaluation scale proposed in Figure 11. 
Whenever the evaluator was certain about his/her perception, he could 
sign with an X the exact point to indicate the difference between the 
5 Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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two figures. If the evaluator was uncertain, he/she could sign an X 
with an interval of fuzziness (as shown in Figure 11). 
 
 
bigger   
 
 
15 times bigger 
 
 
 
 
10 times bigger 
 
 
 
 
5 times bigger 
 
 
 
1 time (equal) 
 
 
 
5 times smaller 
 
 
 
 
10 times smaller 
 
 
 
 
15 times smaller 
 
 
smaller   
Figure 11. Evaluation scale 
 
From these tests, we wish to evaluate different cognitive perception of 
individuals. In fact, by asking people to indicate a fuzzy interval, we Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
 
53
hoped to measure fuzziness in individual perception of their cognitive 
bias. 
The experiment was submitted to a sample of 60 persons randomly 
chosen among undergraduate students of the University of Napoli 
Federico II, and all the responses of the two tests were collected 
respectively in  60 10×  and  60 6×  matrices (see Fig.10), whose rows 
stand for the fuzzy pair wise comparisons and whose columns 
represent the individual decision maker. Each element  ij a ~  of our 
matrices is a triangular fuzzy number denoting the i-th pairwise 
comparison judgement assessed by the j-th decision maker. 
First of all we should clarify that we will test just the modal value 
transformation that uses the value function of prospect theory. The 
spread modification cannot be examined because the two decision 
problems used, for their perceptive nature and simplicity, brought up a 
low amount of uncertainty in judgements. We shall note that simplicity 
is after all a consequence of the fact that for our purposes we need 
decision problems whose exact solutions are known to us, if we want to 
express perceived value in function of objective value and we want to 
observe such relation.  
 
 
Figure 12. Matrix of the sample 
 
It therefore happens the average spread of our fuzzy numbers does not 
reach a minimum size under which it is not possible a mathematical Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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transformation (see Fig.13: the functions meet the vertical axis  1 = x  
for ordinate values less than unity; the figure highlights the no-
transformation area). 
      
1  0 
1 
 
Figure 13. Ambiguity function 
 
We can now proceed to investigate the modal values of the fuzzy 
judgement, that we arrange in what from now on we will call data set. 
This testing has been done through the statistic method known as k-
fold cross validation (Stone 1974, 1977). 
The data set is divided into k subsets. One of the k subsets is chosen to 
be the testing set (see Fig.12) and the other  1 − k  subsets are put 
together to form the training set. We considered this two subsets as 
decision making groups, hence for each of them we worked out the 
geometric mean of the modal values across all the experts belonging to 
it (see i.e. Saaty, 1978; Buckley, 1985; Boender et al, 1989; Gogus and 
Boucher, 1997; for group decision making). In this way we obtain two 
vectors, one from training set and the other from testing set, both of 
which map the perceived values  j i s s  on the known solutions  j i w w . Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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Testing 
set   
Figure 14. The testing set 
 
We then build a perception of value function through a least square 
regression method using the training set vector only. The function we 
thereby fit is assumed to be of the form  c ax y b + =  with  1 0   < < b , 
which is the closest parameterisation of value function shape of 
prospect theory. Such function is asked to predict the output values for 
the data in the testing set. We therefore plot the testing set vector dots 
on that graph to evaluate the root mean square error (RMSE) of the 
testing set, which is used to assess the goodness of the model. The 
described procedure has to be run k times, till each subset has been 
chosen as testing set exactly once. Then the average RMSE across all k 
trials is computed. Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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Figure 15. RMSE of the testing set 
 
6. RESULTS 
Let’s consider first each of the two tests individually. In both cases it 
happens that the regression functions we fit on training sets represent 
a very good prediction of testing set data. We have 
I test: 
68 0
35 0
. RMSE
. RMSE
test
fit
=
=
 
II test: 
71 0
61 0
. RMSE
. RMSE
test
fit
=
=
 
The quantities  fit RMSE  and  test RMSE  respectively represent the 
goodness of the regression and the extent to which the fitted curve can 
predict testing set values. We can ascribe the difference between them 
to the lower variability of training vector that has been built on a larger 
set of individuals than the testing one. The normal distribution of the 
errors around a zero mean pushes us still further to accept this 
explanation. Moreover we applied the modal value transformation to Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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testing vectors using training fitted curves. The thereby modified 
judgements of the decision makers belonging to testing sets, were 
yielding more accurate FHA
∗ solutions, i.e. closer to the correct solution 
of 74% for the first test and of 27% for the second. 
These facts bring us to the first important conclusion: biases connected 
with assessing judgement can be recognized and measured. Also they 
do not depend from specific characteristics of individuals who form the 
experts’ group, and once we fix the decision making situation we are 
able to correct that biases without concern about the features of the 
people expressing the judgements. 
At this point we want to study the consequences of a situational shift 
for the decision framing. To do this we considered the first and second 
test data as training and testing set and vice versa. 
This time the dimensions of the sets on which we built training and 
testing vectors are the same, so we might not be able to explain the 
first case RMSE difference as we previously did. But at a deeper look of 
the second case, we find the regression curve predicting testing value 
with less error than the regression itself (see Fig.14).  
 
 
FIRST CASE 
 
training set: test n.1 
testing set: test n.2 
 
86 0
62 0
. RMSE
. RMSE
fit
test
=
=
SECOND CASE 
 
training set: test n.1 
testing set: test n.2 
 
41 0
69 0
. RMSE
. RMSE
fit
test
=
=
 
Figure 16. Consequences of a situational shift for the decision making 
 
                                                 
∗ It has to be noticed that considering the modal values only, as stated in our premise, 
the FHA is reduced to a normal AHP. In the computation of its solution we therefore used 
the original Saaty’s eigenvector method. Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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This strange phenomenon induces us to believe the second test yields 
more variable responses than the first one, maybe due to an increased 
situational ambiguity or to the way the same test has been submitted 
to people. As we could guess, the application of the modal value 
transformation yields positive shifts in the FHA solution in the second 
case only, where it becomes closer of around 20% to “real priorities”. 
These results leave us more than a suspicion about the independence 
of decisional frame from the judgements shape.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE RESEARCH 
We can assume that cognitive biases do not depend even from the 
specific decision making problem proposed to the experts’ group, and 
that they can be recognized, measured and corrected whatever 
situation has to be faced. 
The change of some variables in place of test planning as much as the 
model application to more complex situations has not been here 
investigated. We believe this could be of interest for future research 
either to give more consistency to our assumptions or to propose some 
others.  
 Rippa et al. / Cuadernos del CIMBAGE Nº8 (2006) 37-61 
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